Technical note: Nonlinear pricing competition with private capacity information
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model with Hidden Information: Sequential Optimality Through Truthful State Revelation
- A Review of Quasi-Convex Functions
- Common Agency
- Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
- Competing Manufacturers in a Retail Supply Chain: On Contractual Form and Coordination
- Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
- Contracting and Information Sharing Under Supply Chain Competition
- Contracting to assure supply: how to share demand forecasts in a supply chain
- Designing supply contracts: contract type and information asymmetry
- Do firms invest in forecasting efficiently? The effect of competition on demand forecast investments and supply chain coordination
- Dynamic price competition with fixed capacities
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Finding Supply Function Equilibria with Asymmetric Firms
- Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Nash Equilibrium and the Industrial Organization of Markets with Large Fixed Costs
- Optimal Auction Design
- Parameterized supply function bidding: equilibrium and efficiency
- Quasi-Concave Programming
- Selecting equilibria in common agency games
- Sharing demand information in competing supply chains with production diseconomies
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Strategic information management under leakage in a supply chain
- Strategic supply function competition with private information
- Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
- Supply Function Equilibrium in a Constrained Transmission System
- Technical note: Optimal long-term supply contracts with asymmetric demand information
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
- The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
Cited in
(4)
This page was built for publication: Technical note: Nonlinear pricing competition with private capacity information
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5740213)