Capacity games with supply function competition
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Abstract: This paper studies a setting in which multiple suppliers compete for a buyer's procurement business. The buyer faces uncertain demand and there is a requirement to reserve capacity in advance of knowing the demand. Each supplier has costs that are two dimensional, with some costs incurred before demand is realized in order to reserve capacity and some costs incurred after demand is realized at the time of delivery. A distinctive feature of our model is that the marginal costs may not be constants, and this naturally leads us to a supply function competition framework in which each supplier offers a schedule of prices and quantities. We treat this problem as an example of a general class of capacity games and show that, when the optimal supply chain profit is submodular, in equilibrium the buyer makes a reservation choice that maximizes the overall supply chain profit, each supplier makes a profit equal to their marginal contribution to the supply chain, and the buyer takes the remaining profit. We further prove that this submodularity property holds under two commonly studied settings: (1) there are only two suppliers; and (2) in the case of more than two suppliers, the marginal two-dimension costs of each supplier are non-decreasing and constant, respectively.
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Cited in
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