Technology transfer with commitment.

DOI10.1007/PL00004109MaRDI QIDQ5940589zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Arijit Mukherjee

Publication date 9 August 2001

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00004109

zbMATH Keywords

Capacity installation, Incentive delegation, Technology licensing.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production models (90B30) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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• Trade and technology transfer in a vertically differentiated industry
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