Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs

DOI10.1007/S00199-024-01580-XMaRDI QIDQ6657661zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Siyu Ma, Debapriya Sen, Yair Tauman

Publication date 6 January 2025

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00199-024-01580-X

zbMATH Keywords

acceptability and feasibility constraintsad valorem royaltiespatent licensingper unit royaltiesthree part tariffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

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Cites work

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• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
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• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
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• Revenue royalties
• Royalty licensing
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• Sequential innovation, naked exclusion, and upfront lump-sum payments
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• The Shapley value of a patent licensing game: the asymptotic equivalence to non-cooperative results
• Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results from Old Methods
• Welfare reducing licensing.

Cited in

(3)

• Optimal pricing policy design for selling cost-reducing innovation in Cournot games
• Licensing a capacity-increasing innovation^
• Technology licensing with partial cross-ownership in a vertical market

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