The strongly stable matching problem with closures
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Cites work
- A faster algorithm for the Strongly Stable b-Matching Problem
- A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
- Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
- Algorithms – ESA 2004
- An $n^{5/2} $ Algorithm for Maximum Matchings in Bipartite Graphs
- An algorithm for strong stability in the student-project allocation problem with ties
- An algorithm for the maximum weight strongly stable matching problem
- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- Characterisation of strongly stable matchings
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Combinatorial optimization. Theory and algorithms.
- Discrete Convex Analysis
- Envy-freeness in house allocation problems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1962834 (Why is no real title available?)
- Matching with quorums
- On Representatives of Subsets
- Stable marriage and indifference
- Stable matchings with ties, master preference lists, and matroid constraints
- Strongly stable assignment
- Strongly stable matchings in time \(O(nm)\) and extension to the hospitals-residents problem
- Strongly stable matchings under matroid constraints
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- The stable marriage problem with master preference lists
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