The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting

DOI10.3390/G13060077MaRDI QIDQ6105152zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marina Bannikova, José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez

Publication date 26 June 2023

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060077

zbMATH Keywords

alternate orderingfixed orderingsequential votingsubgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites work

• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• An experimental study of voting with costly delay
• Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
• Multilateral Bargaining
• Multiperson bargaining over two alternatives
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting

Cited in

(1)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1795899 (Why is no real title available?)

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