Transaction fee mechanism design

DOI10.1145/3674143MaRDI QIDQ6993548zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Tim Roughgarden

Publication date 25 April 2025

Published in Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1145/3674143

zbMATH Keywords

blockchain protocolsethereumtransaction fee mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Cites work

• Credible auctions: a trilemma
• Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules
• Foundations of transaction fee mechanism design
• Knapsack auctions
• Maximizing miner revenue in transaction fee mechanism design
• Monopoly without a monopolist: an economic analysis of the bitcoin payment system
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimality despite chaos in fee markets
• What can cryptography do for decentralized mechanism design?

Cited in

(4)

• Transaction fee mechanisms robust to welfare-increasing collusion
• Strategies for non-myopic users in EIP-1559
• Latency tradeoffs in blockchain capacity management
• Non-myopic bidders in EIP-1559

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