Truthful cake sharing

DOI10.1007/S00355-023-01503-0MaRDI QIDQ7014363zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Xiaohui Bei, Xinhang Lu, Warut Suksompong

Publication date 11 March 2025

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-023-01503-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites work

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• Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
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• Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
• The efficiency of fair division
• The price of fairness for indivisible goods
• Truth, justice, and cake cutting
• Truthful fair division without free disposal

Cited in

(1)

• Approximately fair and population consistent budget division via simple payment schemes

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