Values of Large Games, I: A Limit Theorem

DOI10.1287/MOOR.3.1.1MaRDI QIDQ4177374zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Norman Shapiro, Lloyd S. Shapley

Publication date 1978

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.3.1.1

zbMATH Keywords

CoalitionCooperative GameLimit TheoremMajority GameValues of Large GamesVoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited in

(14)

• Wealth and power in a collegial polity
• Non-cooperative games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces
• Evolution of the distribution of wealth in an economic environment driven by local Nash equilibria
• The inverse problem for power distributions in committees
• Power indices and the measurement of control in corporate structures
• Evolution of wealth in a non-conservative economy driven by local Nash equilibria
• Oceanic Games: Centralization Risks and Incentives in Blockchain Mining
• Game theory and power indices
• Large-scale dynamics of mean-field games driven by local Nash equilibria
• Voting power and proportional representation of voters
• Common behaviour of power indices
• Control and voting power in corporate networks: Concepts and computational aspects
• The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters
• Singular games in \(bv^{\prime }NA\)

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