Common behaviour of power indices

DOI10.1007/BF01769093MaRDI QIDQ789329zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Gianfranco Gambarelli

Publication date 1983

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769093

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicity and continuity resultspower indicesweighted majority game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Review text

The author proves monotonicity and continuity results on power indices when the weight of one player and possibly the majority quota, are increased.

Cites work

• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games
• Values of Large Games, I: A Limit Theorem
• Values of Non-Atomic Games

Cited in

(14)

• Algorithm for automatic computation of the power variations in share tradings
• Power indices for political and financial decision making: A review
• Semivalues as power indices.
• Takeover prices and portfolio theory
• A note on regular semivalues
• Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games
• Power indices and the measurement of control in corporate structures
• Comparing power indices
• Some open problems in simple games
• A new approach for evaluating the Shapely value
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1374992 (Why is no real title available?)
• Minimax multi-district apportionments
• TRANSFORMING GAMES FROM CHARACTERISTIC INTO NORMAL FORM
• On the strong monotonicity of power indices

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