Vertical integration as a source of hold-up

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDV035MaRDI QIDQ4610758zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marie-Laure Allain, Claire Chambolle, Patrick Rey

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/21681/1/wp_tse_525.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

hold-upincomplete contractsvertical foreclosurevertical integration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cited in

(6)

• Market foreclosure without vertical integration
• Vertical integration and knowledge disclosure
• Vertical implementation
• Procurement of advanced inputs and welfare-reducing vertical integration
• Vertical separation as a defense against strong suppliers
• Does vertical integration increase product quality?

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