Welfare functions and group decisions

DOI10.1007/BF00132607MaRDI QIDQ761931zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Karl Borch

Publication date 1984

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00132607

zbMATH Keywords

exponential utility functionsgroup decisionsPareto optimal sharing ruleuncertainty with unanimity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Review text

The author shows that if a group adopts a Pareto optimal sharing rule, it may be able to make decisions under uncertainty with unanimity. A sufficient condition that this will be the case is that the preferences of all group members can be represented by exponential utility functions.

Recommendations

• A foundation for Pareto aggregation
• The impossibility of a paretian rational: a Bayesian perspective
• Unanimity games and Pareto optimality
• A theorem for Bayesian group decisions
• The significance of independent decisions in uncertain dichotomous choice situations

Cites work

• Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market
• On Harsanyi's utilitarian cardinal welfare theorem

Cited in

(3)

• On the consensus effect
• When consensus choice dominates individualism: Jensen's inequality and collective decisions under uncertainty
• A note on decisions under uncertainty: The impact of the choice of the welfare measure

This page was built for publication: Welfare functions and group decisions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q761931)