Coordination of advertising strategies in a fashion licensing contract (Q1035893): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 03:29, 2 July 2024

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Coordination of advertising strategies in a fashion licensing contract
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    Coordination of advertising strategies in a fashion licensing contract (English)
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    4 November 2009
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    The paper characterizes cooperative and non-cooperative advertising strategies of a licensor and licensee involved in a licensing contract in the fashion business. Licensing is the process of leasing a legally protected entity (brand, name, logo, etc.) in conjunction with a product or product line. It consists in a contractual agreement between two business entities: the owner of the property, called licensor; and the renter of the rights, called licensee. It is shown that if the licensor, who acts as the leader, uses an incentive strategy that depends on the licensee advertising, then it can reach the jointly optimal solution in a decentralized way.
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    differential games
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    advertising
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    licensing
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    incentive strategies
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    Stackelberg equilibrium
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    cooperative solution
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