Coordination of advertising strategies in a fashion licensing contract

DOI10.1007/s10957-009-9511-xzbMath1180.91013MaRDI QIDQ1035893

Alessandra Buratto, Georges Zaccour

Publication date: 4 November 2009

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-009-9511-x

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg equilibrium; differential games; cooperative solution; licensing; advertising; incentive strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A12: Cooperative games

91A05: 2-person games

91A23: Differential games (aspects of game theory)

91A80: Applications of game theory

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Cites Work

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