Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions (Q2452268): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 13:13, 8 July 2024

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Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
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