Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00052-9zbMath1013.91034MaRDI QIDQ5934225

Jörg Naeve

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

complete uncertaintyprotective criterionrisk-Ioving agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Characterizing cautious choice ⋮ Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Implementability via protective equilibria
• General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
• Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons
• Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
• Protective and prudent behaviour in games
• Protective behavior in matching models
• Competitive Stability under Weak Gross Substitutability: The "Euclidean Distance" Approach
• Choice under Partial Uncertainty

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