Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games: characterization and existence

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0477-7zbMath1388.91037OpenAlexW264351786MaRDI QIDQ328564

Luyi Zhang, Haifeng Fu, Ying Xu

Publication date: 20 October 2016

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0477-7

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationlarge gamespure-strategy Nash equilibriumsaturated probability spaceatomless probability space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (2)

On the characterization of Nash equilibrium action distributions of large distributional games ⋮ Characterization of Nash equilibria of large games

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