Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0304-8zbMath1300.91007MaRDI QIDQ361803

Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber, Aleksej Vladimirovich Savvateev

Publication date: 19 August 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/15498/1/wp_idei_715.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

fairness; stability; coalition formation; membership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A80: Applications of game theory

Related Items

Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility, A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems, Finding the nucleolus of any \(n\)-person cooperative game by a single linear program, Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities, A note on the core of TU-cooperative games with multiple membership externalities, Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks

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