Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining
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Publication:405554
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.008zbMath1296.91122OpenAlexW3123916725MaRDI QIDQ405554
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.008
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Cites Work
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