A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.002zbMath1280.91099OpenAlexW2015123404MaRDI QIDQ417711

Christian Trudeau

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

corecommon propertyprivate propertyfolk solutionminimum cost spanning tree

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites Work

• Linking the Kar and folk solutions through a problem separation property
• Axiomatization of the Shapley value on minimum cost spanning tree games
• Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games
• On the convexity of communication games
• Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree: beyond the folk solution
• Additivity in minimum cost spanning tree problems
• Computation of the Shapley value of minimum cost spanning tree games: P-hardness and polynomial cases
• Obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree situations and their monotonicity properties
• A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems
• The \(P\)-value for cost sharing in minimum
• Cores of convex games
• On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theoretic approach

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