On the robustness of the competitive equilibrium: utility-improvements and equilibrium points

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.08.008zbMath1304.91151OpenAlexW2005323906MaRDI QIDQ478114

Subir K. Chakrabarti

Publication date: 3 December 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.08.008

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibriumbounded rationalitycompetitive equilibriumNash mappure exchange economysatisficing behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items (1)

Bayesian general equilibrium

Cites Work

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