Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games

DOI10.1007/S00182-014-0451-9zbMATH Open1388.91024OpenAlexW2125485475MaRDI QIDQ495764FDOQ495764

Michel Grabisch, Stéphane Gonzalez

Publication date: 15 September 2015

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01235625/file/ijgt12-2bis.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

balancednesscooperative gamecoregeneral solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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Cited In (5)

• Autonomous coalitions
• Optimal deterrence of cooperation
• Multicoalitional solutions
• Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities
• Rejoinder on: ``Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities

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