Commitment and excess capacity with licensing: An old debate with a new look

DOI10.1007/s00712-011-0196-xzbMath1215.91025OpenAlexW1964259576MaRDI QIDQ547318

Aniruddha Bagchi, Arijit Mukherjee

Publication date: 1 July 2011

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0196-x

zbMATH Keywords

entrylicensingcapacity commitmentexcess capacityincumbent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach
• On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
• Excess Capacity and Collusion
• Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria
• Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities
• Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity
• Technology transfer with commitment.

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