Robustness against indirect invasions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:665109
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.010zbMath1279.91032MaRDI QIDQ665109
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.010
replicator dynamics; stochastic dynamics; evolutionarily stable strategy; Moran process; asymptotically stable; fixation probability; direct invasion; evolutionarily stable set; indirect invasion; neutral mutant; neutrally stable strategy; robust against equilibrium entrants; robust against indirect invasions
91A22: Evolutionary games
Related Items
Instability of belief-free equilibria, On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information, Evil green beards: tag recognition can also be used to withhold cooperation in structured populations, In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting., Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations, Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions, Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation, When and how does mutation-generated variation promote the evolution of cooperation?, An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics, In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs, Direct reciprocity in structured populations
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Imitation processes with small mutations
- On evolutionarily stable sets
- Evolutionarily stable sets in symmetric extensive two-person games
- Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
- Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
- Evolutionarily stable sets
- On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- The Logic of Animal Conflict