Optimal decision rules in repeated games where players infer an opponent's mind via simplified belief calculation

DOI10.3390/g7030019zbMath1406.91026OpenAlexW2484097814MaRDI QIDQ725019

Hisashi Ohtsuki, Mitsuhiro Nakamura

Publication date: 1 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7030019

zbMATH Keywords

heuristicsMarkov decision processcooperationrepeated gamedirect reciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (1)

Hamilton's rule, the evolution of behavior rules and the wizardry of control theory

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Planning and acting in partially observable stochastic domains
• Learning to cooperate with Pavlov and adaptive strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma with noise
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Automata, repeated games and noise
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• The Calculus of Selfishness

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