On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.010zbMath1142.91474MaRDI QIDQ869853

James Schummer, Rakesh V. Vohra, Sven de Vries

Publication date: 9 March 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.010

zbMATH Keywords

duality; primal-dual algorithm; subgradient algorithm; combinatorial auctions; Vickrey auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B44: Economics of information

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

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