On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions
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Publication:932774
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.12.001zbMath1142.91491OpenAlexW2077652138MaRDI QIDQ932774
Ilia Tsetlin, Claudio Mezzetti
Publication date: 11 July 2008
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269781/files/twerp_832.pdf
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Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods ⋮ Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions
Cites Work
- Uses of exchangeability
- The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue
- Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions
- Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions