Weak and strong time consistency in a differential oligopoly game with capital accumulation
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Publication:937142
DOI10.1007/s10957-008-9432-0zbMath1146.91011MaRDI QIDQ937142
Luca Lambertini, Roberto Cellini
Publication date: 20 August 2008
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-008-9432-0
91A23: Differential games (aspects of game theory)
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