Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2009.07.028zbMath1177.91053MaRDI QIDQ1046116

Jun Zhuang, Oguzhan Alagoz, Vicki M. Bier

Publication date: 21 December 2009

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2009.07.028

zbMATH Keywords

game theory; dynamic programming; signaling game; multi-period game; secrecy and deception; truthful disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A80: Applications of game theory

90C39: Dynamic programming

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

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