Voting operators in the space of choice functions

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(86)90027-2zbMath0597.90006OpenAlexW2151580133MaRDI QIDQ1079455

M. A. Aĭzerman, Fuad T. Aleskerov

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170918-132850289

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitysocial choicechoice functionscentral regionLocal voting operatorsmutual exclusive neutralitiesneutrality to variantsnon-imposedness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (11)

Limits on power and rationality ⋮ A comment on Arrow's impossibility theorem ⋮ Arrowian social equilibrium: indecisiveness, influence and rational social choices under majority rule ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of voting operators ⋮ Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences ⋮ Implementation of voting operators ⋮ The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union ⋮ Arrowian characterizations of latticial federation consensus functions ⋮ On dynamic aggregation systems ⋮ Impossibility results for choice correspondences ⋮ Functional voting operators: The non-monotonic case

Cites Work

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• Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
• Decomposition of choice functions into a system of simpler functions
• The Arrow paradox in group choice theory (analysis of the problem)
• Local operators in models of social choice
• Some aspects of the general theory of best option choice
• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Path-Independent Social Choice Functions: A Further Result
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Some Further Results on Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice

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