A theory for the evolutionary game

DOI10.1016/0040-5809(87)90026-8zbMath0618.92014OpenAlexW1999160177MaRDI QIDQ1089283

Joel S. Brown, Thomas L. Vincent

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(87)90026-8

zbMATH Keywords

generating functionsevolutionary game theoryESSfitness functionsevolutionary stable strategiesbilinear continuous gamecoalition frequencycoalition vectorcontinuum of strategiesecological processesfrequency and density dependent selectionmatrix games with mixed strategiesmutant strategiesnontrivial stationary state

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

Related Items (19)

Evolutionary matrix games and optimization theory ⋮ Population dynamics and harvesting of semelparous species with phenotypic and genotypic variability in reproductive age ⋮ Adaptive walks on changing landscapes: Levins' approach extended ⋮ THE G-FUNCTION METHOD FOR ANALYZING DARWINIAN DYNAMICS ⋮ The evolutionary response of systems to a changing environment ⋮ How the resource supply distribution structures competitive communities ⋮ \textit{TPB} and the invasion of adaptive dynamics ⋮ The ideal free distribution: a review and synthesis of the game-theoretic perspective ⋮ An ESS maximum principle for matrix games. ⋮ Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games ⋮ Oligomorphic dynamics for analyzing the quantitative genetics of adaptive speciation ⋮ MODELING CANCER AS AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME ⋮ Unlimited niche packing in a Lotka-Volterra competition game ⋮ EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS IN CARCINOGENESIS ⋮ Revisiting matrix games: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies ⋮ Why does invasion imply substitution? Beyond the paradigm of invasion fitness ⋮ EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS CAN BE CHAOTIC: A FIRST EXAMPLE ⋮ \(G\)-functions for the hermeneutic circle of evolution ⋮ Population viability in three trophic-level food chains

Cites Work

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• Evolutionary games
• Stability in an evolutionary game
• Random evolutionarily stable strategies
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Competition, kin selection, and evolutionary stable strategies
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and viability selection in Mendelian populations
• Evolution under nonequilibrium dynamics
• Strategy stability in complex populations
• Exponential Families and Game Dynamics
• Models of animal conflict
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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