Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation

DOI10.1007/BF00133974zbMath0482.90006MaRDI QIDQ1162902

William V. Gehrlein, Peter C. Fishburn

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

voting proceduresmulticandidate election

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (11)

The expected likelihood of transitivity: A survey ⋮ On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser ⋮ The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle ⋮ Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes ⋮ Condorcet efficiency of constant scoring rules for large electorates ⋮ On probability models in voting theory ⋮ Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and proportional lottery rules ⋮ Obituary: Peter C. Fishburn (1936--2021) ⋮ Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons ⋮ Research in decision theory: A personal perspective ⋮ The Condorcet criterion and committee selection

Cites Work

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• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• A Strategic Analysis of Nonranked Voting Systems
• Approval Voting: A 'Best Buy' Method for Multi-Candidate Elections?

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