Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90009-4zbMath0751.90106OpenAlexW1978666319MaRDI QIDQ1192640

William G. Stanford

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90009-4

zbMATH Keywords

fictitious playsubgame perfect Nash equilibriadiscounted gamenear-optimal stationary dynamic programming

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games ⋮ Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Symmetric paths and evolution to equilibrium in the discounted prisoners' dilemma
• An iterative method of solving a game
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Discounted Dynamic Programming

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