The Neyman-Pearson theory as decision theory, and as inference theory; with a criticism of the Lindley-Savage argument for Bayesian theory

DOI10.1007/BF00485690zbMath0372.62002WikidataQ56853524 ScholiaQ56853524MaRDI QIDQ1244008

Allan Birnbau

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Asymptotic properties of parametric tests (62F05) General considerations in statistical decision theory (62C05)

Related Items (7)

Confidence distributions and empirical Bayes posterior distributions unified as distributions of evidential support ⋮ Did Pearson reject the Neyman-Pearson philosophy of statistics! ⋮ The distinction between inference and decision ⋮ The foundations of statistics - are there any? ⋮ Decisions as statistical evidence and Birnbaum's confidence concept ⋮ Rejoinder: ``On the Birnbaum argument for the strong likelihood principle ⋮ Reconciling frequentist properties with the likelihood principle

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• Note on a Conditional Property of Student's $t^1$

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