On the contribution of a player to a game

DOI10.1007/BF01761602zbMath0373.90092MaRDI QIDQ1245167

K. Appert

Publication date: 1976

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

Allocating joint costs by means of the nucleolus ⋮ (Pre)kernel catchers for cooperative games ⋮ Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game ⋮ Upper and lower bounds of the kernel and nucleolus ⋮ On pseudo-Anosov autoequivalences

Cites Work

• The inequalities that determine the bargaining set \({\mathcal M}_ 1^ {(1)}\).
• \(n\)-person games with only 1, \(n-1\), and \(n\)-person permissible coalitions
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• An application of nonstandard analysis to game theory

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