Residence exchange wanted: A stable residence exchange problem

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(94)00358-0zbMath0907.90199OpenAlexW1973230403MaRDI QIDQ1268437

Yufei Yuan

Publication date: 24 November 1998

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(94)00358-0

zbMATH Keywords

matchingassignmenttradingpublic servicemulti-person gamestable residence exchange problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Case-oriented studies in operations research (90B90) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Individual preferences (91B08)

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