The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(95)00806-3zbMath0929.91003MaRDI QIDQ1278559

Eyal Winter, Emilio Calvo, J. Javier Lasaga

Publication date: 11 January 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(95)00806-3

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value; TU games; balanced contributions; potential function; level structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures, Solidarity in games with a coalition structure, Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation, Another characterization of the Owen value without the additivity axiom, Implementation of the levels structure value, The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure, An implementation of the Owen value., The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions, Axiomatic characterizations of the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues, THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE

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