On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
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Publication:1289254
DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2481zbMath0920.90145MaRDI QIDQ1289254
Hideo Konishi, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber
Publication date: 27 May 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2481
91A12: Cooperative games
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Cites Work
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- Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
