On second-price auctions and imperfect competition.

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00022-3zbMath1055.91015OpenAlexW3125231851MaRDI QIDQ1415912

Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date: 9 December 2003

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(03)00022-3

zbMATH Keywords

Private informationDuopolySelling mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Optimal Auction Design
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

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