Manifolds of multi-leader Cournot equilibria.

DOI10.1016/S0167-6377(03)00090-7zbMath1067.91002MaRDI QIDQ1417589

Andreas Ehrenmann

Publication date: 5 January 2004

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Multiple leader follower gamesNon-uniqueness of equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Basic theoretical foundations and insights on bilevel models and their applications to power systems ⋮ Three modeling paradigms in mathematical programming ⋮ Welfare-Improving Effect of a Small Number of Followers in a Stackelberg Model ⋮ An Optimization-Based Conjectured Response Approach to Medium-term Electricity Markets Simulation ⋮ On the Inefficiency of Forward Markets in Leader–Follower Competition ⋮ On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader-follower game ⋮ Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm ⋮ On Stackelberg–Nash Equilibria in Bilevel Optimization Games ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography ⋮ Oligopolistic markets with leadership, cooperative followers and a multivalued inverse demand function

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Finite-dimensional variational inequality and nonlinear complementarity problems: A survey of theory, algorithms and applications
• Generalized Nash games and quasi-variational inequalities
• A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis
• Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations
• Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequalities and Complementarity Problems
• A variational inequality approach for the determination of oligopolistic market equilibrium

This page was built for publication: Manifolds of multi-leader Cournot equilibria.