The Shapley value on convex geometries

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Publication:1570819


DOI10.1016/S0166-218X(99)00218-8zbMath0955.91002MaRDI QIDQ1570819

Jésus Mario Bilbao, Paul H. Edelman

Publication date: 16 November 2000

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)


91A12: Cooperative games


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