The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0757zbMath0977.91004MaRDI QIDQ1581908

José M. Zarzuela, Gooni Orshan

Publication date: 10 October 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0757

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargaining solution; NTU games; bilateral consistent prekernel

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games, Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games, A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel, The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games, Fuzzy games: a characterization of the core, Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores

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