Strategic similarity and emergent conventions: evidence from similar stag hunt games
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Publication:1590685
DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0711zbMath1006.91017OpenAlexW2078167369MaRDI QIDQ1590685
John B. Van Huyck, Raymond C. Battalio, Frederick W. Rankin
Publication date: 21 December 2000
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0711
learningsimilaritycoordinationevolutionary gamesrisk dominancepayoff dominanceconventionhuman behavior
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