Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem

DOI10.1007/s10951-017-0516-2zbMath1391.90245MaRDI QIDQ1707826

Přemysl Šucha, Sandra Ulrich Ngueveu, Cyril Briand

Publication date: 4 April 2018

Published in: Journal of Scheduling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10951-017-0516-2

zbMATH Keywords

project scheduling; Nash equilibrium; mixed integer programming; time-cost trade-off

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90C11: Mixed integer programming

91A10: Noncooperative games

90C05: Linear programming

90B35: Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research

68M20: Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems

Related Items

Price of anarchy and price of stability in multi-agent project scheduling

Uses Software

• RanGen

Cites Work

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