Optimal crowdsourcing contests

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.09.001zbMath1419.91318arXiv1111.2893OpenAlexW1456359350MaRDI QIDQ1735735

Shuchi Chawla, Balasubramanian Sivan, Jason D. Hartline

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1111.2893

zbMATH Keywords

approximationall-pay auctionBayes-Nash equilibriumcrowdsourcing contest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values ⋮ Contests with dominant strategies ⋮ Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information ⋮ Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests ⋮ On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result ⋮ Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Revenue in contests with many participants
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Contest architecture
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Optimal Auction Design

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