Credit auctions and bid caps

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.10.010zbMath1419.91334OpenAlexW2900285096WikidataQ128970790 ScholiaQ128970790MaRDI QIDQ1735760

David Lagziel

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1810.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

first-price auctionssecond-price auctionsbid-capscredit auctionsdefaulting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement
• Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
• A model of auction contracts with liquidated damages
• Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• COMPARING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
• Precautionary Bidding in Auctions
• High bids and broke winners

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