Conditional expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity
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Publication:1800972
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.08.001zbMath1416.91116OpenAlexW2888239103WikidataQ129347491 ScholiaQ129347491MaRDI QIDQ1800972
Thierry Marchant, Arunava Sen, Nicolas Gravel
Publication date: 26 October 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01988972/file/wp_2016_-_nr_14.pdf
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