An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80021-1zbMath0833.90131MaRDI QIDQ1890915

Reinhard Selten

Publication date: 28 May 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80021-1

zbMATH Keywords

bipolar games; measure of risk dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

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• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information