Monotone comparative statics: changes in preferences versus changes in the feasible set

DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0677-8zbMath1268.91061OpenAlexW2054327707MaRDI QIDQ1950350

Nikolai S. Kukushkin

Publication date: 13 May 2013

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0677-8

zbMATH Keywords

strategic complementaritymonotone comparative staticspreference orderingbest response correspondencesingle crossingquasisupermodularity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (6)

A note on the symmetry of all Nash equilibria in games with increasing best replies ⋮ Optimal combinatorial mechanism design ⋮ Increasing selections from increasing multifunctions ⋮ Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone Best Responses ⋮ Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games ⋮ The single crossing conditions for incomplete preferences

Cites Work

• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Generalized monotonicity analysis
• Strict monotonicity in comparative statics
• A generalization of supermodularity.
• Weak and strong monotone comparative statics
• Improvement dynamics in games with strategic complementarities
• On the Existence of Monotone Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• The Comparative Statics of Constrained Optimization Problems

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