Subgames within large games and the heuristic of imitation

DOI10.1007/s11225-014-9549-0zbMath1329.91016OpenAlexW2051226534MaRDI QIDQ2016082

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-014-9549-0

zbMATH Keywords

potentialneighbourhood structuregame dynamicstype specification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Games involving graphs (91A43) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Vertex subsets with special properties (dominating sets, independent sets, cliques, etc.) (05C69)

Related Items (1)

Reasoning in large games with unboundedly many players

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The evolution of cooperation through imitation
• Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium
• Anonymous games with binary actions
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Characterization of pure strategy equilibria infinite anonymous games
• Potential games
• On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
• Stability under Strategy Switching
• Concurrent imitation dynamics in congestion games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Stochastic Games

This page was built for publication: Subgames within large games and the heuristic of imitation